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Abstract 
   A mobile ad hoc network is a group of mobile hosts that depends on wireless network interfaces with no use of fixed 
infrastructure or centralized administration. The main equipments of a mobile station are wireless transmitters/receivers. In this 
respect, the network can be seen as random chart because of the nodes ‘movement. The change of network topology relies on 
time when nodes move or adjust their transmission and reception parameters. The design of these networks is characterized by its 
vulnerability to denial of service attacks (DOS).Thus, it is very challenging. In this paper, the focus lies on a special kind of 
denial of service attacks called Jamming. Indeed, stations in a mobile ad hoc network share a wireless medium. Therefore, a radio 
signal can be jammed or interfered, which leads to the corruption and loss of the message .In this study , we suggest a new 
method of detection of that predictable attack by the application of the statistical process control (SPC). The SPC can be the key 
element of the detection of jamming attack, applied on the packet drop ratio (PDR) which refers as the number of dropped 
packets to the total of packets sent. The assimilation of this metric shows the nonconforming fraction. As we evaluated the 
performance, we substantiate that the control chart for fraction nonconforming based on the PDR detects the jamming attack in a 
real time by a visual graph. 
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1. Introduction 
   Jamming attack can deliberately lead to the stoppage or disruption of wireless communication. Interferences at the 
transmissions are due to jamming attack. It may appear on purpose by network load or in form of attack. A jammer 
can easily fulfilled by listening to the shared medium and transmitting in the same bandwidth as network, with no 
need of particular hardware. 
The wireless medium causes various security threats to wireless networks12. Any station equipped with a transceiver 
can spy on going transmissions, inject fake messages, or block the transmission of legitimate ones. One of the 
essential keys for damaging the network performance is by jamming wireless transmissions. In the straightforward 
form of jamming, the scamper distorts transmitted messages due to interferences in the network’s operational 
frequencies, and in closeness to the targeted receivers. As jamming attacks lower the performance of wireless 
networks, some effective methods are needed to detect their existence .Among techniques used in wireless medium, 
we have steady, tricky, reactive, smart, and random jammers. 
Various metrics are used in the literature to describe jamming attacks 5: 
• Packet delivery ratio refers to the ratio overall number of packets correctly received to the total number of 
packets received. 
• Packet sent ratio, which is measured at the transmitter side, is the total number of acknowledgments packets 
received to the total number of packets transmitted. 
• Carrier sensing time can be seen as the time when a station has to wait for the channel to get inactive to start its 
transmission. 
• Signal strength is meant the power that is clearly seen on the receiver end. 
   In our study, the focus will be on another metric for the jamming attack as we will highlight through the 
simulation results. This metric is called the packet drop ratio (PDR). This latter refers the number of dropped 
packets to the total of packets sent. 
This paper is divided into six sections: The next section is about a concise summary of previous work done on 
jamming detection and classification in wireless networks.  The third section provides an analysis on the impact of 
the jamming attacks. The fourth section explains our proposed model for the detection of the jamming attacks. The 
forth section, the authors evaluate the performance of their approach using NS2 simulator. The last section sheds 
light on conclusions and perspective. 
2. Related work 
   In the nature of the wireless medium in ad hoc network, attackers can easily monitor communications between 
wireless devices and launch simple denial of service attack against wireless networks by jamming or interfering 
communication. In this respect, via conventional security mechanisms, such attacks in the physical layer cannot be 
detected. There are various attack strategies that a jammer can perform so as to overlap with other wireless 
communications. The authors in5 classify the types of jammers as follow: 
• Constant Jammer can be seen as the continuous emission of a radio signal that performs random bits. 
• Deceptive Jammer refers to the fact that it does not transmit random bits instead of transmitting semi-valid 
packets unlike the continuous jammers. That is, the packet header is valid but the payload is useless.
• Random Jammer means the Alternation between two modes namely sleeping and jamming the channel. The 
first one jams for a random period of time (it can behave either like a constant jammer or a deceptive jammer), 
the second one (the sleeping mode) turns its transmitters off for another random period of time. 
• Reactive Jammer‘s aim is not to waste resources by the fact of jamming when it senses the act of transmission. 
The key focus is on the receiver, trying to input as much noise as possible in the packet to modify many bits 
relying  on less  amount of power needed to modify enough bits so that when a checksum is performed over 
that packet at the receiver it will be grouped  as not legitimate and therefore rejected. 
   Several approaches have been proposed in the literature for the detection of the jamming attack in wireless 
networks: 
A new detection scheme for the jamming attack was suggested by the authors in9; the packet delivery ratio and 
signal strength were chosen as the jamming attack metrics for their system. The scheme utilizes a multimodal 
consistency check for jamming detection. Each node compares the value (packet delivery ratio, signal strength) with 
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thresholds that are decided by experiments.  
To detect the existence of jamming attack in ad hoc networks a new model based on the measure of relationship 
among the error and the correct reception times proposed by the authors in10. The core objective is to identify a 
specific type of jamming; the authors believe that the jammer transmits only when valid radio activity is signaled 
from its radio hardware. A transmission node measures the Error Probability (EP) and the Correlation Coefficient 
(CC). The CC is among the reception error time and the correct reception time. Therefore, the network is regarded 
as jammed when CC is larger than produced relative EP. 
In this paper11, a three dimensional model is proposed by the authors. It is based on signal strength, PDR (Packet 
Delivery Ratio), and pulse width (PW) of the signal causing a significant improvement in accuracy in addition to 
classifying jamming attacks in a better way. It considers that PDR, signal strength variation, and pulse width yield 
results which conform with experimental results. 
3. Impact of jamming attack 
   To determine the impact of the jamming attack in IEEE 802.11 on the performance of the network, the simulator 
NS-28 with the following simulation parameters are selected (Table 1), In the NS-2 simulations we can use some 
useful tools for processing traces files as described by1,2: 
Table 1 . Platform and parameters 
Parameters Values 
Computer HP Compaq 6730s 
Operating System Ubuntu 10.10 
Version of the simulator ns-2.348
Trace file processing language Perl 
Graph construction tool Microsoft Excel 2007 
Transmission rate (Mb/s) 2 
MAC layer 802.117
Physical layer Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum 
Simulation surface (m) 500x500 
Transmission range (m) 250 
Radio propagation model Shadowing 
Traffic generator CBR Constant Bit Rate 
Simulation time (s) 60 
Packet size (byte) 1000 
Routing Protocol AODV 
Node speed (m/s)  Randomly selected between 0 and 15 
Mobility model Random Way Point6
    
Our simulations were focused on the transmitter with the aim of evaluating the performance of two metrics: the 
throughput and the packet drop ratio. First, we have chosen a small network of 4 nodes in total including a receiver, 
and we compared two scenarios (with and without attack). At the thirtieth second, we activated a jammer. Figures 1 
and 2 show the results of simulation with a granularity of one second: 
Fig.1 . Measure of the throughput under jamming attack. 
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Fig.2 . Measure of the packet drop ratio under jamming attack.
   The figure 1 and the figure 2 show that the three nodes are at the foot of equality and oscillate about the same 
throughput, and the same packet drop ratio. The oscillatory character of the curves can be explained by IEEE 802.11 
equity in term of the access to the transmission channel. The effect of the movement speed on the performance of 
transmissions is also tested. Actually during the simulation time nodes moved with an arbitrarily selected speed 
between 0 and 15m/s. This reveals the absence of the influence of the movement speed. It appears evidently that the 
throughput decreased to reach 0 after the jammer activated from the thirtieth second. The packet drop ratio increased 
and became less fluctuant. 
The throughput in the presence of a jammer decreased to become zero, because of interferences that lead to useless 
transmitted data. In figure 2 we investigated all packets, including routing packet and those relating to the MAC 
layer. 
In the following section we suggest a new detection strategy based on statistical quality control approach (statistical 
process control).We use the control chart for fraction nonconforming, applied on the packet drop ratio. 
This new strategy for detection can be applied to any transmitting node to monitor the network in real time, as we 
will demonstrate by simulation; modifications of the IEEE 802.11 standard are not required by the suggested 
detection scheme. 
We claim that our approach has not been proposed before in the literature to detect jamming attack in mobile ad hoc 
networks. 
4. Proposed detection system 
4.1. Basic idea 
   The basic idea of our strategy for detecting the jamming attack in mobile ad hoc networks emerges from the shift 
observed on the packet drop ratio. In the previous section we displayed that this attack caused an increase of the 
packet drop ratio for honest nodes. As we have demonstrated through NS2 simulation results another metric for the 
jamming attack in our paper is considered. This metric is the PDR (packet drop ratio) which is defined as the 
number of dropped packets to the total of packets sent. The PDR is assimilated to the fraction nonconforming. 
The basis of our detection method is the supervision of the packet drop ratio by two limits in a graph. These graphs 
are called control chart. 
The detection of deviation is one of the basic principles of this control. No variations on a system require 
modification. Actually, two processes are never exactly similar. There are many sources of variations of low 
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amplitude that cannot be removed. The common causes of dispersion 3 are represented by all these variations of low 
amplitude. 
The SPC method provides a strong tool to separate the ordinary from the extraordinary by plotting powerful control 
charts, among these charts are: The control chart for fraction nonconforming3. 
4.2. The control chart for fraction nonconforming 
The fraction nonconforming is defined as the ratio of the number of nonconforming items in a population to the 
number of items in that population4. The fraction nonconforming is usually expressed as a decimal. The base of the 
control chart for fraction nonconforming is the binomial distribution. 
The average of fraction of nonconforming is expressed by4: 
ത ൌ σ ୈ౟౟ౣసభ୫୬                                                                                                                                                                      (1) 
Where m is the number of samples, n is the sample size and Di is the number of nonconforming in the sample size n. 
The center line (CL), the upper control limit (UCL) and the lower control limit (LCL) for fraction nonconforming 
are calculated as follow4: 
 ൌ ത ൅ ͵ට୮ഥሺଵି୮ഥሻ୬                                                                                                                                                     (2) 
 ൌ ത                                                                                                                                                             (3) 
 ൌ ത െ ͵ට୮ഥሺଵି୮ഥሻ୬                                                                                                                                                      (4) 
4.3. Detection system 
The main objective is to identify a reactive jammer. Concerning this kind of jammer, it is not essential to jam the 
channel while none is on communication. Rather, when the channel is inactive, the jammer remains quiet and at the 
same time starts diffusing a radio signal once it feels activity on the channel. It is necessary to indicate that a 
reactive jammer does not exigently save energy as the jammer’s radio has to be permanently on so as to feel the 
channel. However, the principal advantage for a reactive jammer is the possibility of being difficult to identify5. 
The p indicated in the chart stands for the packet drop ratio, n refers to the total number of packets (sample size), 
and ത to the average of the packet drop ratio.  
We suggest inspecting and plotting the packet drop ratio by control chart through this controlling procedure (Table 
2). 
Table 2 . Look–Up table of the chart parameters 
The fraction of nonconforming Packet drop ratio 
Average of the packet drop ratio 
(center line) 
  ൌ ത
Upper control limit of the fraction 
nonconforming control chart   ൌ ത ൅ ͵ඨതሺͳ െ തሻ
Lower control limit of the fraction 
nonconforming control chart   ൌ ത െ ͵ඨതሺͳ െ തሻ
We can sum up the judgment and the perceptions of the novel detection strategy in the following block diagram 
(Figure 3): 
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curve of the packet drop ratio oscillate on each side of the mean and that the majority of the points are inside the 
limits. Apparently, it can be concluded that this node connects in an environment without jamming attack. 
Later on, when the jammer is activated from the thirtieth second, the upper control limit has been crossed by the 
curve, a strong detour is noticed. As a result, it can be concluded that this node is under a jamming attack. 
We can add that in the presence of a constant jammer, we will see a curve crossing the upper control limit for all the 
simulation time. Unlike the random jammer where the packet drop ratio goes to oscillate on each side of the upper 
control limit.   
Fig.4 Monitoring of the packet drop ratio by the control chart for fraction nonconforming.
5.3. Generalization of the detection method 
The average of the packet drop ratio is plotted as a function of the number of nodes. The graphic below (Figure 5) 
demonstrates the results. It can be noticed that miniscule and random variations in the curve are identified. The chart 
parameters should be calculated for each nodes number in order to get greater network supervision. 
Fig.5 Average of the packet drop ratio as a function of the number of nodes.
We tried to compute the center line based on the number of nodes because the main factor for the packet drop ratio 
is the network’s load. Accordingly, the control chart parameters are updated by every transmitter for every number 
of nodes. In this study, the identification scheme was evaluated in an excellent situation that is based on the nodes 
number with regular bit rate traffic. The statistical process control represents a practical and a solid means for the 
supervision and the identification of strong derivations in any kind of situations (realistic or theoretical).So, the 
objective is the detachment of the exceptional from the familiar cases.  The latter is called common case (without 
jamming attack). 
Our proposed scheme has several advantages better than other methods existing in the literature. It works in real 
time, based on one metric and doesn’t demand modifications to the IEEE 802.11 protocol. 
6. Conclusion 
The jamming attack may drive to the deterioration of the network’s performance. In this research, we tried to 
suggest a novel identification scheme concerning this attack depending on the supervision of one metric (packet 
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drop ratio) by means of analytical process charts. There are many benefits of the identification scheme. Changes are 
needless in the IEEE 802.11 protocol also, we can implement the identification scheme at any diffusing node, and 
the most important benefit is the identification of an identical attack in genuine time by a visual graph. 
We are going to do our best so as to broaden the suggested scheme through offering other performance 
measurements for the sake of developing other identification systems. Moreover, we will try to make an 
implementation of the identification strategy in a realistic situation. 
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